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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1988, the Costa Rican government passd a major tax reform bill. This 
legislation was prompted by a desire to increase work effort, savings and investment via 
changes in the tax code. It was also prompted by a desire to achieve greater income 
equality and improve the fiscal situation. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to determine whether the 1988 Tax Reform Act has 
achieved its goal of greater income equality. This is done by determining, through 
appropiate measures, if the new personal income tax rates are more or less progressive 
than the old rates. Several progressivity measures will be used to compare the 
progressiveness of the income tax for both the pre-reform and post-reform periods. 
Progression will be measured by applying some classical measures, such as, the average 
tax rate, the marginal tax rate, marginal rate progression, liability progression, and 
residual income progression. Moreover, a newer and more advantageous measure will be 
used: the rate of share adjustment. 
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Basically, this study has two main objectives: (a) to describe and to evaluate the 
different progressivity measures, based on the literature, and (b) to determine the 
progressivity of the personal income tax in Costa Rica before and after the reform took 
place. 
Significance of the Study 
This study is relevant for Costa Rican society in general because it provides 
insight into the effects of the reform in terms of income redistribution, i.e., it determines 
who gains and who loses as a result of the new tax policy. This study is an example of 
policy evaluation in terms of equity considerations. It gives policymakers a perspective 
about how to analyze the impact that a new tax structure could have on the economic 
position of those who are taxed. The results are very important in terms of distributive 
justice and taxation. 
By introducing the rate of share adjustment measure, this study goes further than 
previous studies based on the classical coefficients because it takes into account both the 
redistribution and the differential impact of the tax on the different income groups that 
takes place as a result of the imposition of the tax. In addition, the rate of share 
adjustment measure shows how each income group fares relative to the rest of the 
population. The previous measures differ from this measure in that they relate taxes to 
income but do not contemplate distributional effects. 
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Outline of Work 
This work is structured in six chapters. The present chapter has been a brief 
introduction to what will be studied and the motivation behind the study. The second 
chapter deals with a review of the progressivity concept and the literature on 
progressivity measures. The third chapter provides information about some aspects of the 
Costa Rican institutional framework. This section is intended to give a closer idea of the 
Costa Rican economy in the tax reform context, the composition of its taxes and some 
background on the 1988 Tax Reform. The fourth chapter explains the data and 
methodology used in the study. As will be explained, it was necessary to apply a special 
procedure to derive representative results for the post-reform period. The fifth chapter is 
an analysis of the empirical work and it outlines the most important findings. Finally, the 
sixth and last chapter presents some final conclusions. 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE PROGRESSIVITY CONCEPT 
Previous researchers who studied the effect of taxes on income distribution have 
used different measures to determine tax progressivity. In 1928, A.C. Pigou defined the 
average rate progression and the marginal rate progression. Later, Musgrave and Thin 
( 1948) used those indexes and defined some more progressivity measures such as the 
liability progression, the residual income progression and the effective progression. 
Rosen (1992) mentioned what he calls a "natural way to define" progressiveness and 
regressiveness by doing it in terms of the average tax rate- i.e., the ratio of taxes paid to 
income. Each index constitutes an effort to determine how progressive or regressive a 
particular tax is in terms of its impact on either the d:stribution of the tax burden or the 
distribution of income. 
In 1938, Simons defined "a progressive income tax as a means of reducing 
economic inequalities" (Kopelman, 1988, p. 289); whereas, Jakobsson stated: "(t]oday it 
seems natural to choose income redistribution instead of traditional equity theory as a 
framework for a discussion of the degree of progression" ( 1976, p.162). Finally, as Kiefer 
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( 1984) points out what is important is to be able to understand what each measure tries to 
explain, given its characteristics and implications. Moreover. it is necessary to recognize 
that no measure of progressivity is perfect (Atkinson and Stiglitz. 1980. p. 268) and that 
"measuring how progressive a tax system is presents an even harder task than defining 
progressiveness" (Rosen, 1992). 
Classification of the Progressivity Measures 
After Wart and Ruggeri (1991) the measures ofprogressivity may be classified as: 
a) aggregated or disaggregated and 
b) structural and distributional. 
The aggregated or global indexes use one measure for the income distribution and 
the disaggregated ones give more details about the impacts that the tax has on the income 
structure. The structural measures refer to the relationship between tax and income and 
compare the impact of the tax in the different population subgroups (Baum p.171 ). Those 
measures were first studied by Musgrave and Thin ( 1948), as mentioned above. The 
distributional measures determine progressivity based on the income redistribution that 
takes place because of the tax. Thus, distributional indexes are a function of the tax 
structure, but also of the distribution of income. 
Usually, distributional measures are based on the concept of the concentration 
index 1• For instance, Kiefer (1984) states six distributional progressivity indexes that 
1The coefficient of concentration defined is a measure of income inequality, usually related to the Lorenz curve and the 
Gini index. Moreover, Lorenz curves are a special case of concentration curves. The Lorenz curve is the 
concentration curve for income. Following Kakwani (1977a pp. 719-720) let X be the income and F(x) be its income 
distribution which represents the population income units having income less than or equal to X. If the mean u of the 
distribution exists then the first moment distribution function Fl (x) is defined and it represents the proportion of total 
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make use of the Gini coefficient for after-tax and before-tax income, and the 
concentration index of taxes (p. 498). Those indexes are the Effective Progression Index, 
the Pechman-Okner Index, the Reynolds-Smolensky Index, the Khetan-Poddar Index, the 
Kakwani Index and the Khetan-Poddar-Suits Index. The problem with these measures is 
that the relevance of their information in terms of policy is not clear, given that they do 
not "relate directly to the relationship of tax liability to ability-to-pay or the effect of the 
tax system on the distribution of income" (Kiefer, 1984, p. 507). 
Although there are many measures, the economic literature related to inequality 
measures has been mostly based on the Lorenz curve approach and the Gini coefficient as 
instruments to determine the distribution of income in the economic analysis2(See for 
example Gastwirth (1972), Kakwani (1977) and Kakwani and Podder (1976)). These 
indexes are the subject of the next section. 
Classical Progressivity Measures 
The Lorenz Curve 
Kakwani defines the Lorenz curve as the one that "relates the cumulative 
proportion of income units to the cumulative proportion of income received when units 
are arranged in ascending order of their income." Moreover, he recognizes that the Lorenz 
curve is "widely used as a convenient graphical device to represent the size distribution of 
income and wealth" (1977a, p. 719). Similarly, Pechman and Okner (1974) refer to the 
income earned by income units having income less than or equal to X. That is, the Lorenz curve is the relationship 
between F(x) and Fl(x). The Gini index is one minus twice the area under the Lorenz curves. 
2Furthennore, Atkinson ( 1970) relates the social welfare function and the Lorenz curve. 
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Lorenz curve as the one that " shows the cumulative percentage of the aggregate income 
received by any given cumulative percentage of recipients arrayed by the size of their 
income". Graphically, the Lorenz curve curve relates the accumulated percent of total 
family income in the y-axis to the accumulated percent of families in the x·axis. The 
closer the Lorenz curve is to the 45-degree line (the line of equal distribution) the more 
equal (the less unequal) the distribution of income is. (See Figure I). Thus, the Lorenz 
curve corresponds to an aggregated type of measure and may be classified as a 
distributional index. 
One of the problems with the Lorenz curve is that the density function of the 
income distribution to derive it is not known so that it has to be approached with either a 
Pareto or a lognormal function. The shortcoming with this estimation procedure is that a 
good fit to the actual data is very difficult to achieve. Kakwani and Podder advocate that 
Lorenz curves have some properties that could serve the purpose of finding an equation 
of the Lorenz curve that fits actual data closely (I 976, p.13 7). 
As defined by Kakwani, the distance between the Lorenz curve of pre-tax and 
post-tax income depends on both the tax elasticity and the average tax rate. However, he 
argues that because the average tax rate can change without changes in tax elasticity or 
progressivity, "by simply comparing the Lorenz curves of pre-tax an post-tax income one 
cannot arrive at a suitable measure of progression" (1977, p. 723). 
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This index is "the most widely used measure of income inequality" (Kakwani, 
1977a) and its definition depends on the Lorenz curve specification3 ; that is why the 
literature almost always relates the Gini coefficient and the Lorenz curve. Indeed, the 
Gini index can be classified as a global distributional progressivity measure. Pechman 
and Okner define the Gini coefficient as "a measure of the equality or inequality in a 
3The Gini index is equal to one minus twice the area under the Lorenz curve, as mentioned in footnote I. 
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distribution"4given by "the ratio of the area between the Lorenz curve and the 45-degree 
line to the entire area below the 45-degree line", i.e. A/ A +B from Figure 1. This ratio may 
take values from zero (when there is a perfectly equal distribution) to one (which 
corresponds to the case of perfect inequality). 
Suits measures the progressivity of a tax with a "figure similar to a Lorenz curve 
but one in which the accumulated percent of the tax burden is plotted vertically against 
the accumulated percent of income on the horizontal axis" (1977, p.748). Hence. this Gini 
ratio is calculated analogously to the one obtained from a usual Lorenz curve but it 
measures something slightly different. In fact, Suits states that his index is "inspired by 
and related to the Gini ratio" (p. 747). However, he is able to measure and compare the 
degrees of progression for different taxes such as the personal property tax, payroll tax, 
sales and excise taxes, individual income tax, property tax and corporate income tax. 
Simultaneously to Suits' study, Kakwani (1977b) developed some measures of 
progressivity. In both cases the measures are related to the Gini ratio of income 
inequality, according to Formby, Seaks and Smith (1981 ). Kakwani determines the effect 
of taxation on the income distribution and the effects of the income distribution on taxes 
(p. 77) by using a "Lorenzian income inequality" and a "Lorenzian tax inequality." 
Earlier, Gastwirth (1975) used the Gini index to estimate a family of measures of relative 
inequality to determine income distribution and industrial concentration. 
Although the Gini coefficient has been widely utilized, there has been some 
controversy about its efficacy. For instance, Morgan (1962) affirmed that "the Gini index 
is the best single measure of inequality" whereas Atkinson5 (1970,p. 62) argues that such 
an index is misleading for two reasons: 
4Gastwirth refers to the Gini index as the fonnula that measures relative inequality as"it is the ratio of a measure of 
dispersion, the mean difference, to the average value (IJ)." ( 1972, p. 307) 
~ot only Atkinson but also Dasgupta, Sen and Starrett (1973), Sen (1973) and Blackorby and Donaldson (1978) 
criticize the Gini index. 
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''Firstly. the use of ... [the Gini ratio] often serves to obscure the fact that a 
complete ranking of distributions cannot be reached without fully specifying the form of 
the social welfare function. Secondly. examination of the social welfare functions implicit 
in [such a ratio] shows that in a number of cases [it has] propenies which are unlikely to 
be acceptable. and in general there are no grounds for believing that [it] would accord with 
social values." 
Blackorby and Donaldson (1978) agree with Atkinson ( 1970) in the sense that the 
Gini coefficient has '"ethically perverse properties'' (p. 79). They state that the Gini index 
is defined over the entire space so that it ranks "as indifferent some distributions of 
income which have negative components with others which have all positive 
components". 6Gastwirth ( 1972, p.306) focuses on three shortcomings of the Gini 
coefficient: relative insensitivity, difficulty in computation, and the problems related to 
the inclusion of negative incomes. In order to minimize those shortcomings, Gastwirth 
obtains an upper and lower bounds to the Gini index from data that are grouped in 
intervals where the mean income in each interval is known. Based on the assumption that 
most income distribution comes from a frequency function that decreases in the large 
income range, he developed improved bounds for the Gini ratio. Finally, Gastwirth shows 
that "the Gini index can be accurately estimated without fitting curves to data whenever 
the data are grouped properly." He aknowledges, however, that "some future problems 
remain" (1972, p.314). 
Elteto and Frigyes( 1968) argue that the Gini coefficient is advantageous because 
of its simple geometric interpretation. Nevertheless, they recognize some disadvantages 
related to it like its relative insensitivity, the difficulties connected with its computation 
from empirical data and its lack of direct economic meaning" (pp. 383-384). 
6Furthennore, those authors point out that "the only distributionally homothetic function which does not behave in this 
ethically perverse way is the Rawls maximim rule" (p. 74). 
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One of the main disadvantages of the Lorenz curve and the Gini coefficient is 
"their inability to distinguish differences in progressivity at different levels of income" 
and their "deceptive results under some circumstances" (Baum, p.l69-170). As Baum 
argues, these "indices fail to deal adequately with 'crossover' cases where Lorenz curves 
intersect and with situations in which the redistribution involves gains (or losses) for the 
middle relative to the extremes, causing a crossover." 
Finally, even though the Lorenz curve and the Gini ratio are the most widely 
recognized classic measures, there are some other indexes that have been popular as well. 
Other Classical Progressivity Measures 
In I 928 A. C. Pigou7mentioned some progressivity measures that were later 
referred to by Musgrave and Thin (I 948) as the average rate progression and the marginal 
rate progression. The calculation of these measures is based on the average tax rate and 
the marginal tax rate, respectively. They both could be classified as structural and 
disaggregated progressivity indexes, given that each index relates tax to income and that 
it is possible to obtain these measures for each income group . 
Average Tax Rate (ATR) 
The average tax rate index is Tfyi, where Ti is the tax liability for the ith income 
group, and Yi is the income level for the ith income level. This index expresses tax 
liability as a percentage of income. A tax structure is said to be progressive when the 
average tax rate increases as income rises, in which case "after-tax income would be more 
equally distributed than before-tax income" (Kakwani, I 977, p. 723). The tax is 
7 A C. Pigou, Public Finance, London, 1928. 
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proportional if this index is constant for all income levels, and regressive if the index 
decreases as income goes up. 
As mentioned above, for Rosen the average tax rate is the "natural way" to define 
progressiveness or regressiveness. 
Marginal Tax Rate (MTR) 
The marginal tax rate index is BTfay;. A tax is progressive when the marginal tax 
rate is greater than the average tax rate; proportional when the marginal rate is equal to 
the average rate; and regressive when the average tax rate exceeds the marginal tax rate. 
However, after Kakwani (1977), if the marginal tax rate does not increase as income 
increases but the average tax rate does, income will be still more equally distributed by 
imposition of the tax. Then, the increasing marginal tax rate is a stronger condition than 
the increasing average tax rate" (p. 723 ). 
Average Rate Progression (ARP) 
I; To 
---
~ Yo ARP is equal to: ---
~-Yo 
where: 
BATR 
BY ' 
T 1: tax liability for income Y 1, 
T0: tax liability for income Y0, and 
ARP measures the degree of progression since it is defined as the rate of change in 
the average tax rate. If a tax is progressive, the A TR increases as income increases and 
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the ARP is positive. As a result, when the ARP is greater than zero the tax is progressive, 
when less than zero it is regressive, and when equal to zero it is proportional. 
If the average tax rate changed by the same number of percentage points, the ARP 
would remain unchanged. That would be the case if the A TR increased from 15 to 17 
percent for one income level, from 20 to 22 percent for the next income group and so on. 
In plotting the A TR against the income level, such a 2 percent increase would imply a 
parallel shift in the average rate curve (Musgrave and Thin pp. 500-501 ). However, if 
there was an increasing increment in the percentage points of the A TR (yield increase) 
throughout the different income classes, the degree of progression would increase. In the 
case of a yield decline, progression would increase with a decreasing decrement in 
percentage points when moving up the income scale. 
A special property of the ARP is that it can be used for political purposes. 
Musgrave and Thin point out that if there is a yield increase, the "interest of the high-
income group will be served best by adopting the concept of the average rate 
progression"; whereas the interest of the low-income group will be threatened. This 
occurs because the "larger the ratio of required yield to taxable income the greater will 
tend to be the share contributed by the lower incomes" (Musgrave and Thin p. 502). On 
the other hand, the ARP is more informative for comparisons of tax burdens. 
Marginal Rate Progression (MRP) 
r;-r; T;-To 
1:'; - J:; J:; - 1:';, BMTR 
The MRP is equal to, --=--....:.........-=---__;;.... = --
1:';- ~ ar 
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Musgrave and Thin( 1948) argue that the marginal rate progression 1s an 
alternative to the average rate progression. MRP is defined as the rate of change in the 
marginal tax rate of a tax. In this case, Y2 is defined to be slightly larger than Y1. Given 
that the MRP is the derivative of the marginal tax rate with respect to income (Pigou~ 
1949, p. 49), if the marginal rate progression is zero then the tax structure is proportional; 
if the MRP is positive the structure is progressive~ and if the MRP is negative the tax 
structure is regressive. Progression remains the same if the MTR increases by an equal 
number of percentage points across the income groups. (Musgrave and Thin, 1948, p. 
504). 
"The basic definition of progression as an increasing average rate is compatible 
with the definition of progression as an increasing marginal rate only under the condition 
that the marginal rate is continuously rising(at a decreasing rate) when moving up the 
income scale." (Musgrave and Thin, 1948, p. 503). On the other hand, "from the 
perspective of the equity theory of the tax structure, MRP is a more informative and more 
restrictive measure than ARP, since positive MRP always implies positive ARP" (Van 
WartandRuggeri, 1991,p.135). 
Similarly to the ARP, the MRP could be used to serve different social interests. 
For instance, after the ARP, the MRP is the measure that would be chosen by the rich. 
Conversely, poor peoples' interests will be best served by the MRP and then by the ARP. 
In other words, "what is the rich man's order of preferences for rate increase is the poor 
man's order of preference for rate reduction" (Musgrave and Thin, p. 512). The average-
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marginal relationship serves as an explanation for this: \Vhen A TR is rising. the rv1TR is 
above the ATR but the MTR does not necessarily rise.it could be falling. Thus. what 
would be progressive under the A TR could be regressive after the MTR. That is \vhy the 
MRP becomes a more informative and n1ore restrictive measure than the ARP. as 
mentioned above. 
Liability Progression (LP) 
This coefficient is based on changes in the an1ount of tax liability. It is de1ined as 
the ratio of the percentage change in tax liability to the percentage change in incon1c: that 
is, the elasticity of tax Iiabi lity with respect to income before taxes. 
Thus. LP equals.---
7;) 
y 
0 
l~ l~ ~%,Y. 
}~) 
After rearranging this expression. Atkinson and Stiglitz define the LP as the ratio 
of the marginal to average tax rate. or MTR/ A TR. 
The Liability Progression index will be equal to one when the tax is proportionaL 
greater than one when the tax is progressive and less than the unity when it is regressive. 
This is because when LP is greater than one, the tax liability increases relatively more 
than income increases so that the MTR is greater than the A TR. Moreover, when LP is 
equal to one the percentage tax increase is equal to the percentage increase in the income 
level; thus the MTR and the ATR are equal so that the preferences of both the rich man 
and the poor man are equally satisfied and everybody in the economy is taxed at the same 
rate. In the case where LP is less than one the percentage increase in tax liability is 
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smaller than the percentage increase in income, so that higher income people are favored. 
Poor people, then, are paying relatively more. 
LP will remain unchanged for all income classes when there is an equal 
proportionate change in average rates. "For an increase in yield the rate structure 
becomes more (less) progressive if the proportionate increase in the average rate rises 
(falls) with rising incomes. [T]he reverse relationship holds for a decline in rates." 
(Musgrave and Thin, pp. 505-506). 
Wart and Ruggeri state that a positive LP is sufficient for positive MRP given 
how the LP coefficient is defined. On the other hand, they recognize that Jakobsson 
(1976) Hdirectly relates LP to the distribution ofthe tax burden" (pp. 151-152). 
One of the advantages of the LP index is that, like the ARP, it is more infonnative 
for comparisons of tax burdens. 
Residual Income Progression (RIP) 
This index measures the degree of progression as the ratio of the percentage 
change in income after tax to the percentage change in income before tax. It is the same 
as the elasticity of income after tax with respect to income before tax. 
RIP= fa-fa ~-fa 6%Y 
After Atkinson and Stiglitz, it may also be defined as follows: 
1-MTR 
RIP= 1-ATR 
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The smaller the RIP the more progressive the tax. When the RIP is one the tax is 
proportional, when it is less than one it is progressive and when it exceeds one it is 
regressive. More explicitly, if RIP is one, the change in income before tax is equal to the 
change in income after tax when moving up the income scale. For example, if there were 
only two income groups in the economy the following would happen: 
Income before tax 
100 
200 
Thx 
10o/o 
Income after tax 
90 
180 
There is a 100 percent increase in both the before-tax and after-tax incomes. In the 
case where RIP is less than one income after tax is inelastic with respect to income before 
tax. That is, as before-tax income increases along the income scale, income after tax 
increases by a smaller proportion. (1-MTR) is smaller than ( 1-ATR), i.e. MTR is greater 
than A TR. MTR is increasing more rapidly than A TR is increasing. The opposite happens 
when RIP is greater than one. 
A strong point of this progressivity measure is that it is "the measure of tax 
progression most closely connected with the redistributive effect of the tax system, 
judged by the criterion of Lorenz domination" (Jakobsson, 1976, p. 161). 
After Musgrave and Thin, all the above classical measures of "structural 
progression" are merely technical devices which have no economic significance as such. 
For them, the effective progression8 measure is the one that tells most about the 
~his index measures the extent to which a given tax structure results in a shift in the distribution of income toward 
equality (Musgrave and Thin, p. 51 0). 
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equalizing effects of a tax. This. as they point out should be the '"essence of any 
progression policy"(p. 514 ), given that it is the ratio of the coefficient of equality of the 
distribution of income after tax to the corresponding coefficient before tax. 
Finally, even though the above measures have been very popular, the intention in 
this study is to measure progressivity by using a relatively new index, the Relative Share 
Adjustment (RSA) measure, which, as it will be shown, proves to be strongly 
advantageous. 
Relative Share of Adjustment Measure 
The Relative Share of Adjustment (RSA) measure was developed by Sandra 
Baum ( 1987) and can be classified as a distributional and a disaggregated index measure 
because it determines the impact of a tax on the income share of each income group. RSA 
is calculated as the ratio of the after tax income share of the ith group to its pre tax share: 
where: 
Y : total income before tax 
T : total tax liability 
Yi- Ti 
(RSAi)a = y Yi T 
y 
Yi: income before tax for the ith income group 
Ti: tax liability for the ith income group 
RSA can also be expressed as the ratio of one minus the average tax rate of group 
ito one minus the average tax rate for the population as a whole: 
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where : ti = Ti I Y i and t = T I Y. 
1- ti (RSAi) =-
, 1-/ 
As Wart and Ruggeri (1991) point out, RSA "corresponds uniquely" to the 
average rate progression (ARP) developed by Musgrave and Thin ( 1948). defined as the 
rate of change in effective tax rates as income rises; that is: 
ari 
ar Yi Ti 
ARPi =_I = 8Yi 
8Yi Yi 2 
On the other hand, the rate of change of RSA with respect to income is: 
8Ti 
Yi oYi- Ti 
BRSAi Yi 2 
----------= --~--
Y-T 8Yi 8Yi 
y 
which is equal to the ARP for group i divided by the ratio of aggregate after-tax to 
before-tax income. 
If the after-tax income share of the ith income group is greater than the pre-tax 
share, that ith income group is said to be better off with the tax. In such a case the RSA 
will be grater than one. In contrast, when the RSA is less than one the ith group is worse 
off. Greater increases in the shares of lower-income groups relative to higher income 
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groups indicate a more progressive tax; thus, the RSA will be greater than one for low-
income people and less than one for high-income people. 
One of the advantages of the RSA is that it allows one to measure the 
redistribution that takes place as a result of the imposition of a tax. Thus, the set of RSAs 
indicate the overall progressivity related to the tax. Moreover, "it highlights changes in 
inequality without obscuring the differential impact of taxes on different income groups" 
(Baum, p.l70). As a result, RSA "views income redistribution as a policy objective of the 
tax system" (Wart and Ruggeri, p.l35). 
Traditionally, the use of utility functions has been the way to measure inequality 
and progressivity. RSA results are very convenient because they do not require 
interpersonal utility comparisons, making that measure a relatively simple one. In 
addition, RSA shows how each income group fares relative to all the population. After 
Baum, "one of the advantages of RSA over other measures is that its computation shows 
the pretax distributional changes so that progressivity changes attributable to 
modifications in the pretax distribution may be identifiable" ( 1987 ,p.l7 5). In addition, 
this measure is useful "both because of its simplicity and because of the amount of 
information it provides about the impact of a tax" (Baum, p. 166). However, as with any 
other progressivity measure, the RSA has some weak points. For instance, "[a]s a 
disaggregated index of progressivity, RSA does not involve any weighting scheme of 
redistribution and, therefore, does not provide a measure of social welfare change" (Wart 
and Ruggeri, 1991)9• Moreover, the RSA does not allow one to obtain the progressivity of 
9Pfhaler ( 1987) suggests the assignment of nonlinear monotonically increasing weights to local RSA to make it an 
aggregate measure using some welfare criteria 
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a group of taxes by taking a weighted average of the progressivity of the individual 
taxes.
10 The RSA was used by D. Van Wart and G. C. Ruggeri (1991) to estimate the 
effects that the Canadian personal income tax reform had on the progressivity of the tax 
based on Baum' s measure. Even though the RSA measure does have some problems, 
overall it has convenient characteristics that make it suitable and advantageous for this 
study. Before measuring the effects of the reform on the income tax for Costa Rica, 
however, the institutional framework is presented in the following section. 
10In contrast, for the Khetan·Poddar-Suits and the Kakwani indexes this property does hold (Kakwani, 1984). 
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CHAPTER III 
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
Background 
One of the major problems of the Costa Rican economy has been the size of the 
fiscal deficit which in the last ten years has averaged 3 percent of the GOP. This deficit 
has been financed primarily in three ways: taxes. fiscal bonds, and open market 
transactions. Some authors believe that this deficit has been the result of a lack of 
adequate budgetary planning and excessive Government expenditure. They relate the 
problem to the deficits of state-owned enterprises, the excess of public workers that make 
it difficult to obtain the desired efficiency, and duplication in some functions of public 
agencies. For the last several years, Government expenditure has averaged 18.6 percent 
of GOP (See TABLE I). Out of the total Government revenue, income taxes account for 
more than 88 percent during 1978-1993 (See TABLE II). Tax administration has been 
inefficient, with tax avoidance a major problem. As a matter of fact, the income tax-to-
GOP ratio decreases from 16.1 percent in 1983 to 13.6 percent in 1986 (See TABLE Ill). 
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Table I. Government Expenditure to GOP ratio, Costa Rica, 1978-1993 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
GOVT. EX PEND. 5,039 6,504 8,210 9,755 14,609 26,044 31,978 35,945 
GOP 30,194 34,584 41,400 57,103 97,505 129,314 163,011 197,920 
Gov Ex p. -i:>-GOP ratio 16.7% 18.8% 19.8% 17.1% 15.0% 20.1% 19.6% 18.2% 
Figures in nominal Costa Rican Colones 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Costa Rica 
Table I. Government Expenditure to GOP ratio, Costa Rica, 1978-1993, continued 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
GOVT. EXPEND. 46,275 50,356 63,035 82,430 99,143 123,388 158,336 197,910 
GOP 246,579 284,484 349,743 425,911 522,925 689,848 878,284 1,070,587 
Gov Exp.-to-GDP ratio 18.8% 17.7% 18.0% 19.4% 19.0% 17.goA, 18.0% 18.5% 
Figures in nominal Costa Rican Colones 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Costa Rica 
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Table B. Percent structure of the Cen1Jal GovemmentCunent noome, 
Costa Rica, 1978-1993. 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
CURRENT REVENLE 100.0% 100.0"~ 100.0"~ 100.0"~ 100.0"~ 100.0"~ 100.0"~ 100.0"/o 
lnoome Tax Revenue 96.5% 94.6% 95.3% 95.3% 97.5% 97.3% 91.3% 92.7% 
Non inoome tax revenue 3.5% 5.4% 4.7% 4.7% 2.5% 2.7% 8.7% 7.3% 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Costa Rica 
Table U. Percentslructure ofthe Central GovemmentCunentncorne, 
Costa Rica, 1978-1993, oontinued. 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
CURRENT REVENUE 100.0"~ 100.0"/o 100.0"/o 100.0"~ 100.0"/o 100.0"~ 100.0"~ 100.0"~ 
Income Tax Revenue 88.5% 92.1% 93.0"~ 96.5% 98.9% 98.3% 97.4% 96.6% 
Non income tax revenue 11.5% 7.9% 7.0"~ 3.5% 1.1% 1.7% 2.6% 3.4% 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Costa Rica 
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Certainly, the more the Government expends the more sources of income the 
Government needs. To ease the pressure to find new revenues, the Costa Rican 
Government is looking for opportunities to cut its expenses. For instance, the 
Government is considering the possibility of selling some of the state-owned enterprises 
like the Production National Council and the National Liquor Plant to the private sector. 
Nevertheless, even if those enterprises were sold and the bureaucracy diminished, it will 
still be necessary to have an adequate tax policy so that both efficiency and equity 
principles are satisfied. Thus, focusing on both reducing the Government spending and 
avoiding, at least, the creation of new taxes by improving the tax collection of the 
existing ones has been a major concern in Costa Rica. The argument is that, with new 
taxes, short-run stabilization may take place on the basis of a reduction in the fiscal 
deficit, but this action would motivate neither investment nor production; thus, there 
would be a negative effect on the economic growth. ( cf. Guardia, 1987, p.20). 
In order to alleviate the fiscal deficit and, hence, its related consequences for the 
Costa Rican economy 11 , the Central Government of Costa Rica made very important 
decisions concerning its tax policy in the period 1986-1989. 
11Qne of the biggest problems caused by the deficit spending is the crowding -out of investment given that the fiscal 
deficit is financed not only with taxes but also with bonds. 
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Table lit ~come Tax and Tax Revenues-&GtP Ratios. Costa Rica, 1978--1993. 
1978 1979 19Ekl 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Tax Revenues 3,801 4,010 4,671 6,932 12,282 20,835 24,659 29,666 
ncomeTax 897 937 998 1,484 2,!:()8 4,712 4,737 5,023 
GOP 30,194 34,584 41,4()5 57,103 97,505 129,314 163,011 197,920 
nco me Tax-to-GOP ratio 3.0% 2.70/o 2.4% 2.6% 3.00/o 3.6% 2.9% 2.5% 
Tax Revenues b-GOP rati 12.6% 11.6% 11.3% 12.1% 12.6% 16.1% 15.1% 15.0% 
Figures in nominal Costa Rican Colones 
Source:MinisE!ry of Finance and CEFSA.. 
Table Ill. ~come Tax and Tax Revenues-b-GDP Ratios, Costa Rica,197S..1993. 
continued 
1986 1987 1988 1989 199) 1991 1992 1993 
Tax Revenues 33,639 41,138 50,426 61,444 73,233 99,052 136,694 173.740 
Income Tax 5,695 6,290 8,035 9,507 11,821 14,545 19,016 24,338 
GOP 246,579 284,484 349,743 425,911 522,925 689,848 878,284 1,070,587 
Income Tax-to-GOP ratio 2.3% 2.2% 2.3% 2.2% 2.3% 2.1% 2.2% 2.3% 
Tax Revenues to-GOP rati 13.6% 14.5% 14.4% 14.4% 14.0% 14.4% 15.6% 16.2% 
Figures in nominal Costa Rican Colones 
Source:Minisery of Finance and CEFSA.. 
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Three modifications in tax law were proposed to the Congress: 
( 1) the update of a la\\: project related to taxes on \Yorkers and on tirn1s. 
(2) a set of reforms intended to introduce son1e adjustn1ents to existing taxes and 
to approve new ones. in order to attain greater tax equity. and 
(3) a new code of norms and procedures. in order to modernize the existing tax 
administration (Naranjo. p. 140). In addition. the Govemn1ent intended to enforce tax 
control programs and to prevent tax evasion. 
Tax Composition 
The income tax is a tax levied on taxable. or net. income. The consumption tax is 
a tax that consumers are obliged to pay when buying goods or services. The sales tax is 
the tax levied on those individuals or firms that sell goods or services. The incon1e tax in 
Costa Rica is imposed on both workers and firms. and the personal income tax accounts 
for 85 percent of the total income tax revenue. 
Among the tax sources in 1978, the income tax and consumption tax together 
represented approximately 50 percent of total tax income and the sales tax accounted for 
only 12.5 percent. By 1984. however, the sales tax had become more important than the 
income tax and even than the exports tax which had been the country's most significant 
tax in the early 1980s (See TABLE IV). This pattern has prevailed in recent years due to 
the 
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Table N. Percent Structure oflhe Tax Revenues. Cental Government 
CostJ Rica 197Pr 1993 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
TAX REVENUES 100.0010 100.0010 100.0010 100.0010 100.0010 100.00/o 100.00/o 100.00/o 
Income tax 23.6% 23.4% 21.4% 21.4% 23.7% 22.6% 19.2% 16.9% 
Consu"1ltion tax 24.1% 21.9% 27.7% 20.6% 15.1% 14.1% 18.1% 18.2% 
Sales tax 12.5% 12.8% 13.3% 9.9% 12.3% 21.6% 23.4% 23.2% 
mportstax 17.2% 19.00/o 17.5% 13.00/o 8.00/o 11.6% 17.0% 21.4% 
Exports tax 18.7% 18.3% 15.7% 32.1% 38.4% 21.6% 15.6% 14.1% 
Others 4.00/o 4.7% 4.4% 3.00/o 2.6% 8.4% 6.6% 6.2% 
Source:MiniSi!ry of Finance and CEFSA. 
Table N. Percent Structure oflhe Tax Revenues. Central Government 
Costa Rica 197Pr1993, continued. 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
TAX REVENUES 100.00/o 100.00/o 100.00/o 100.00/o 100.00/o 100.00/o 100.00/o 100.00/o 
Income tax 16.9% 15.3% 15.9% 15.5% 16.1% 14.7% 13.9% 14.00/o 
Consumption tax 16.00/o 16.1% 15.0% 15.5% 15.2% 11.2% 16.7% 18.1% 
Sales tax 23.9% 25.9% 26.9% 27.4% 29.3% 36.1% 37.6% 35.7% 
mportstax 19.8% 23.00/o 19.3% 20.5% 24.5% 24.6% 20.2% 22.7% 
Exports tax 17.7% 12.0% 10.2% 5.7% 3.00/o 5.5% 4.2% 2.9% 
Others 5.71% 7.7% 12.7% 15.4% 11.8% 7.9% 7.4% 6.5% 
Source:MiniSi!ry of Finance and CEFSA. 
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fact that tax reform required that the sales tax be levied on n1any activities that were 
exempted before. This situation conforms with trends studied hy the Fiscal Affairs 
Department of the International Monetary Fund 12• which points out that "'there has been a 
clear tendency toward lower rates of taxation on the individual" and that Latin American 
countries "have undertaken reforms that resulted in lower marginal tax rates for the high 
income brackets~·. 
1988 Tax Reform 
In April 21 of 1988 a tax reform on the income tax was officially adopted in Costa 
Rica. This reform was intended to reduce marginal tax rates, to extend the tax base, and to 
clearly distinguish between tax obligations for income from work and income from 
lucrative activities. In addition. the reform intended to reduce fiscal evasion by improving 
the collection mechanism 13 . On the other hand, one of the purposes was to create a more 
broad-based tax structure since the tax base had been narrowed because of preferential 
treatment 14 . The Government was also looking forward to having a tax liability 
redistribution, in order to comply with the equity principle. For instance, a tax on luxury 
houses with a value of 5 million colones or more was oroposed with rates from 1.0 to 1.5 
percent. There was also an increase in the tax on travel abroad. 
12IMF. "Trends and Future Directions in Tax Policy Reform: A Latin American Perspective". Fiscal Affairs 
Department, June 1992. p.4. 
13Nevertheless, it is worthy to take into account what Tripathy says in this regard:" ... even the best administrative 
organization cannot satisfactorily collect income taxes from the self-employed when evasion is generally attempted 
and it incurs little or no moral disapproval from the public as is generally prevalent in the under-developed countries" 
( 1968,p. 182). 
14Jo motivate the process of production transformation and the non traditional exports, the Government had been 
relieving the exports sector from paying both the income tax and the tax on imported raw materials and capital goods 
if those goods were used to export (Naranjo and Zuniga, p. 143 ). 
29 
With respect to individuals with lucrative activities, marginal tax rates declined 
from 50 percent to 25 percent for high income groups (taxable income of 1.000.000 
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colones yearly), and the number of tax brackets decreased. As a result, the new tax 
structure seems less equitable because the highest tax rate for individuals with lucrative 
activities (25 percent) was less than the one imposed on firms (30 percent). In addition, 
individuals with lucrative activities were exempt up to 200.000 colones of net income a 
year. Moreover, the highest tax rate that one of these individuals would pay is 25 percent 
for an income over 1.000.000 colones, whereas a small business would pay only a 10 
percent tax for an income up to 3.000.000 colones and a 20 percent tax for an income up 
to 6.000.000 colones. This difference would be somewhat compensated by giving some 
credits to those individuals with dependents. 
The reform stated that the maximum tax for workers was a twelfth of their total 
annual income. Then, as mentioned above, the "new tax structure implied a sensitive tax 
reduction for those workers with higher income" (Naranjo and Zuniga, p. 142). This 
situation prevented some tax evasion and had a positive impact on Government 
revenues 16• In fact, in the postreform period the income tax-to-GDP ratio remained, at 
least, stable after having been declining since 1983 (See TABLE III). In the long run, this 
15The exchange rates were 145.7, 120.5 and 112 colones per dollar for years 1987, 1988 and 1989 respectively, 
according to IMF International Financial Statistics. 
16Skinner and Slemrod ( 1985) argue that tax simplification and reduced marginal tax rates may be associated with a 
decline in tax evasion (p. 352). 
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result would have a positive impact on Costa Rica's economic development given that 
saving, investment and work effort would be promoted 17. 
Taxfilers are all those who file taxes according to what it is required by law. The 
only exempt organisms are the Government, the municipalities, autonomous and semi-
autonomous institutions that are exempt by a special law, religious institutions, 
cooperatives, non-lucrative associations~ and the Hasociaciones solidaristas". 
Taxpayers are those individuals and corporations that make lucrative businesses in 
the Costa Rican national territory, independent of their nationality or residence, or, in the 
case of corporations, independent of their constitution, the place of their board of 
directors meetings or their contract holdings. 
Taxpayers must file taxes within the two months following the tennination of the 
corresponding fiscal period, i.e., the latest date possible is the last business day of 
November each year. This is true even when the gross income is totally or partially 
exempt from paying taxes. The tax liability can be paid until the last business day of 
December each year. 
Gross income is the total income or total benefits received in the tax period, 
coming from any Costa Rican source. The tax period corresponds to one year, from the 
first day of October to the last day of September. 
Net income is the income resulting from subtracting both the costs and expenses 
necessary to earn the benefit or profit, and all the other expenses allowed by the Income 
17In this respect, Tripathy affinns that a "highly progressive income tax with high marginal tax rates on upper income 
ranges ... tends to conflict with the criteria of economic efficiency and progress in a context where the growth of 
private savings and investment occupies an important place in the process of economic development"(p.l88). 
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Tax Law, supported by the required documentation. Net income corresponds to taxable 
income. 
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CHAPTER IV 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Data for this study were taken from the official Income Tax Fiscal Statistics 
published by the Costa Rican Ministry of Finance. More specifically, the 1987 data 
correspond to chart n. 15 of this document under the following title: "Taxfilers, 
Taxpayers and Non-taxpayers Workers Income Tax Distribution, by gross income level, 
Fiscal Period 1987, at May 31 year 1988". These data include the number of taxfilers for 
each income group and their gross income level, the number of taxpayers and non-
taxpayers, taxpayers' gross income per income class, the level of taxable income for 
taxpayers per income group, and the corresponding amount of family credits. 
One important consideration with these data is that for both pre-reform and post-
reform periods, the number of taxpayers is less than the number of taxfilers because the 
tax system is structured in such a way that some individuals are exempt due to family 
credits and high levels of expenditure. Therefore, it seems more accurate to work with 
33 
taxfilers' gross income instead of taxpayers' gross income if one is to account for the 
progressivity existing in the exemptions system. In fact, Blum and Kalven state that 
"[u]nder a single rate of tax the granting of an exemption to all taxpayers results in a 
progression of effective rates" and that "[ s ]uch progression comes about because the 
taxpayers have a progressively larger fraction of their incomes subject to tax once they 
are over the exemption level" (1953, p. 4). 
On the other hand, since the causes 18 and the amount 19 of tax avoidance are not 
considered in this study, it will be assumed that the difference between the number of 
taxfilers and the number of taxpayers is mostly due to the exemptions system. The main 
assumption then is that everybody who, according to the law has to pay, in fact does 
pay20. However, as mentioned, the fact that tax evasion in Costa Rica has been a problem, 
should arouse some thoughts about its effects on the progressivity of the tax. For instance 
Skinner and Slemrod ( 1985) state that tax evasion may affect vertical equity "since some 
sources of income available to higher (or lower) income groups may be more difficult to 
detect and hence result in widespread tax evasion and greater (or less) tax 
progressivity." (p. 34 7) 
Since, in 1987, data on personal income (Yi) and tax liability (Ti) are available-
i.e. were published by the Ministry of Finance- the effective average tax rate is calculated 
by income class for the pre-reform period as TiNi. However, for the pre-reform period 
18Some of the reasons for a compliance gap are the following: high marginal income tax rates (Clotfelter, 1983, p.363) 
and inflation that "is pushing people into higher and higher tax brackets and increasing the pressure to cheat." 
(Thomas Vitez, 1984). 
19In fact, there exist some ways of measuring tax avoidance. For example, the estimate of noncompliance in the United 
States of more than $100 billion reported by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in 1983. 
20p0 r studies on tax evasion see Spicer ( 1987), Graetz and Wilde ( 1985) and Stiglitz ( 1985). 
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(fiscal year 1987) the official tax schedule has a different incon1e aggregation than found 
in the Ministry of Finance document. 
Table V, Official Tax Schedule for \Abrkers. Costa Rica, 1987 
Over Up to 
(colones) (colones) 
0 138,000 
138,000 170,000 
170,000 220,000 
220,000 292,000 
292,000 385,000 
385,000 475,000 
475,000 578,000 
578,000 699,000 
699,000 1,100,000 
1,100,000 1,650,000 
1,650,000 2,200,000 
2,200,000 3,300,000 
3,300,000 + 
Source: Direcci6n General de Ia Tributaci6n Directa 
Estadisticas Fiscales del lmpuesto sobre Ia Renta 
Periodo Fiscal1987, San Jose, Costa Rica, 1989. p.100 
Tax Rate 
5% 
10% 
14% 
17% 
19% 
21% 
26% 
29% 
34% 
39% 
46% 
49% 
50% 
Since these income ranges do not coincide with those presented by the Ministry of 
Finance in its Fiscal Statistics for that year21 , a tax schedule was calculated for the latter 
levels of income by adjusting each level according to the ranges in Table V. For instance, 
the adjustment for the 100,000 to 150,000 range IS the following: 
0.76(5%)+0.24(10o/o)=0.062, i.e. a 6.2% tax rate22 . The resulting marginal tax schedule 
and its corresponding yield are the following: 
21 see Estadistjca fiscal del Impuesto sobre Ia Reota. Periodo 1987. Direccion General de Ia Tributaci6n Directa. San 
Jose, Costa Rica. Enero 1989, p. 52. 
220.76 comes from dividing 38/50 and 0.24 comes from dividing 12/50. 
35 
Table VI, Adjusted Tax Sdledule for V\brtters, Costa Rica, 1987 
Over Up to Marginal 
(colones) (colones) Tax Rate 
0 50,000 5.00% 
50,000 100,000 5.00% 
100,000 150,000 6.20% 
150,000 200,000 12.40% 
200,000 250,000 15.80% 
250,000 300,000 17.30% 
300,000 350,000 19.00% 
350,000 400,000 19.60% 
400,000 450,000 21.00% 
450,000 500,000 23.50% 
500,000 600,000 26.60% 
600,000 700,000 29.10% 
700,000 800,000 34.00% 
800,000 900,000 34.00% 
900,000 1,000,000 34.00% 
1,000,000 2,000,000 41.00% 
2,000,000 3,000,000 48.40% 
3,000,000 + 49.70% 
Source: Direcci6n General de Ia Tributaci6n Directa 
Estadisticas Fiscales del lrnpuesto sobre Ia Renta 
Periodo Fiscal1987, San Jose, Costa Rica, 1989 
Yield 
(colones) 
2,500 
2,500 
3,100 
6,200 
7,900 
8,660 
9,500 
9,800 
10,500 
11,750 
26,600 
29,050 
34,000 
34,000 
34,000 
409,500 
484,000 
Once the MTR and the effective A TR are calculated, the next step is to get the rest 
of the measures, i.e., MRP, LP, RIP, and RSA. Hereafter, this procedure will be called 
Procedure I (See Table VII). 
The MRP is defined as the rate of change of the MTR. However, following the 
argument stated by Wart and Ruggeri, since the MTR is discontinuous, the MRP is going 
to be measured at the colon threshold for the rate of change within each class. Thus, MRP 
for each income level will correspond to the percentage point change in MTR from the 
adjacent lower income class. Moreover, LP and RIP calculations are based on the 
Atkinson and Stiglitz definition in which, LP = MTRJATR, and RIP= (1-MTR)/(1-ATR) 
(See Table VII). 
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Table VI. Progressivity Measures 
Pre-ret;)lm (Procedure 0 
.,come Group Average Marginal MRP lP RIP ~ RSAU 
(colones) Tax rae Tax rae 
0.1-SO,CXX> O.OOCX> 0.0500 0.9500 1.0283 1.0283 
50,CXX>.1-100,CXX> O.OOCX> 0.0500 O.OOCX> 0.9500 1.0283 1.0283 
100,CXX>.1-150,CXX> O.OOCX> 0.0020 0.0120 0.9380 1.0283 1.0283 
150,CXX>.1-200,CXX> O.OOCX> 0.1240 0.0020 0.8760 1.0283 1.0283 
200,CXX>.1-250,CXX> O.OOCX> 0.1580 0.0340 0.8420 1.0283 1.0283 
250,CXX>.1-300,CXX> 0.0002 0.1732 0.0152 no.1943 0.8270 1.0281 1.0281 
300,CXX>.1-350,CXX> 0.0009 0.1900 0.0168 201.6338 0.8108 1.0273 1.0273 
350,CXX>.1-400,CXX> 0.0024 0.1960 0.0060 81.9783 0.8059 1.0258 1.0258 
400,CXX>.1-450,CXX> 0.0052 0.2100 0.0140 40.0014 0.7942 1.0229 1.0229 
450,CXX>.1-500,CXX> 0.0103 0.2350 0.0250 22.8731 0.7729 1.01n 1.01n 
500,CXX>.1-6(X),CXX> 0.0193 0.2660 0.0310 13.8176 0.7484 1.0085 1.0085 
600,CXX>.1-700,CXX> 0.0338 0.2905 0.0245 8.5982 0.7343 0.9936 0.9936 
700,CXX>.1-800,CXX> o.04n 0.3400 0.0495 7.1212 0.6931 0.9792 0.9792 
800,CXX>.1-~.CXX> 0.0582 0.3400 O.OOCX> 5.8405 0.7008 0.9684 0.9684 
900, CXX>.1-1 CXX>, (XX) 0.0059 0.3400 O.OOCX> 5.1588 0.7066 0.9605 0.9605 
1,CXX>,CXX>.1-2,CXX>,CXX> 0.0960 0.4095 0.())95 4.2661 0.6532 0.9296 0.9296 
2,CXX>,CXX>.1-3,000,CXX> 0.1124 0.4840 0.0745 4.3071 0.5813 0.9127 0.9127 
3,000,CXX>.1 + 0.0057 0.4970 0.0130 7.5603 0.5384 0.9607 0.9607 
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Finally, RSA I is obtained by using both the average tax rate per income range 
and the overall average tax rate, i.e., ti = Ti/Yi, and t = T /Y. In other words, RSA will be 
equal to (1-ti)/(1-t); where t = T87/Y87. or 6,290,000,000 divided by 284,484,000,000, and 
ti is the average tax rate per income class, where: 
T 87 : total tax liability for year 1987. 
Y 87 : total tax filers income for year 1987. 
RSA II results from applying the (RSAi)8 definition referred to before. As 
expected, RSA I and RSA II have the same numerical values. 
For the post-reform period it turns out that there exist some limitations on 
obtaining the progressivity measures based on an effective ATR. These limitations are: 
1. There were two different laws in effect in fiscal year 1988. That is, the 1988 
Tax Reform Act (Law 7092), started to be in force in June 1, 1988, when there were still 
four months left in that fiscal year. In other words, the pre-reform tax schedule (Law 
83 7), was effective from Oct. 1, 1987 through May 31, 1988. The problem posed by this 
timing is that the data are not available in a disaggregated way, so as to be able to analyze 
the two situations (pre-reform and post-reform) separately. 
2. There were no tax filing after the 1988 Tax Reform became effective because 
tax reform required the collection of the income tax from the employee directly. This 
regulation was initiated, as mentioned, to improve the collection mechanism. As a result 
of this, there were no data available following the year 1988, so that is not possible to 
obtain the ATR's that indeed were paid by workers, as it was done for the 1987 fiscal 
period. 
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Given the above, 1988 data are not convenient to use. On the other hand, since 
there are no data for 1989, it was necessary to use a procedure (hereafter called Procedure 
II) to obtain the post-reform ATR's. This procedure applies the 1989 marginal tax 
schedule to the 1987 da~ the idea being to determine tax reform effects on the same pre-
reform income earners. 
The post reform tax schedule23 is the following: 
Table VIII, Official Tax Schedule forV\brkers, Costa Rica, 1989 
Over Up to 
(colones) (colones) 
0 
540,000 
816,000 
540,000 
816,000 
+ 
Source: Direcci6n General de Ia Tributaci6n Directa 
Estadisticas Fiscales del lmpuesto sobre Ia Renta 
Periodo Fiscal1989, San Jose, Costa Rica, 1989. p.95 
Tax Rate 
0% 
10% 
15% 
This schedule is adjusted for the same income levels that were used for the 1987 
fiscal period, in the same way as done for the pre-reform case. For example, the second 
income above (540,000 to 816,000 range), is adjusted as follows: 
Table IX, ~ustment of the New Tax Structure to the 1987 Income Brackets 
Over Up to Tax Rate 
(colones) (colones) 
500,000 
600,000 
700,000 
800,000 
600,000 
700,000 
800,000 
900,000 
0.4(0% )+0.6(1 00/o )=6% 
10% 
10% 
.16(10% )+0.84(15% )=14.2 
23See Estadistica Fiscal del Impuesto sobre Ia Reota. Periodo 1989. Direccioo General de Ia Tributaci6o Directa. Sao 
Jose, Costa Rica. 
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If this procedure was done for all income levels the adjusted post-reform marginal 
tax schedule would be: 
Table X, Tax Uability per Income Level, Costa Rica, 1989 
Over Up to Excess Tax 
(colones) (colones) (colones) 
Tax up to the 
Lower Bound 
Tax 
Uability 
0 500,000 ExefT1)t 0 0 
500,000 600,000 6.0% 0 2, 766 
600,000 700,000 10.0% 6,000 10,500 
700,000 800,000 10.0% 16,000 20,636 
800,000 900,000 14.2% 26,000 32,587 
900,000 1,000,000 15.0% 40,200 47,303 
1,000,000 2,000,000 15.0% 55,200 95,083 
2,000,000 3,000,000 15.0% 205,200 263,355 
3,000,000 + 15.0% 355,200 964,130 
The goal, then, is to obtain the expected tax liability per income level by applying 
the above tax schedule in Table X to a representative income bracket. An average income, 
then, was calculated per income range. That is, 1987 tax filers' total income was divided 
by the 1987 number of taxfilers for each income class. This taxfiler per capita income 
gives an idea of the average personal income per income group for the 1987 fiscal year 
(See Table XI). Furthermore, the excess by which that average income exceeds each 
income level's lower bound is going to be the taxable portion of the individual's income 
for that income level. For example, in the 450,000 to 500,000 income range, per capita 
income is 4 74,185, so the excess over the lower bound of that income level is 24,185. 
This amount times the corresponding MTR will result in the tax liability value - hereafter 
called "the excess tax" -for that specific income level. This excess tax will be zero given 
that incomes up to 500,000 were exempt in 1989. In the case of the 1,000,000 to 
2,000,000 income range, per capita income equals 1,265,884 so that the excess on the 
lower bound is 265,884 which would be taxed in the margin at a 15%, giving the excess 
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tax of 39,883 colones. See Table XI. To obtain the level of tax liability the tax up to the 
lower bound is added to the excess tax value in Table XI. 
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Table XI. Tax~ lWld ATRCalculation (Procedure II), Costa Rica. Post-rebrm Period. 
Over Upi:> ncome(YQ ncomeper Excess on MTR Tax upi:> Excess Tax liab. ATR 
(colones) (colones) capi8 (Yi pc) lower bound lower bound a per cap. 
0 50,00) 2,(l!9,200 3,270 3,270 O.QD/o 0 0 0 0.0% 
50,00) 100,00) 8,723,310 78,588 28,588 O.QD/o 0 0 0 0.0% 
100,00) 150,00) 26,033,(&1 129,518 29,518 0.0% 0 0 0 O.QD/o 
150,CXXl 200,00) 73,404,558 179,036 29,036 O.QD/o 0 0 0 O.QD/o 
200,00) 250,00) 294,242,023 231,141 31,141 0.0% 0 0 0 0.0% 
250,00) 300,00) 939,619,309 279,649 29,649 O.QD/o 0 0 0 0.0% 
300,00) 350,00) 3,102,847,653 323,956 23,956 O.Oo/o 0 0 0 O.QD/o 
350,00) 400,00) 2,530,1lJ7,294 373,224 23,224 O.QD/o 0 0 0 O.QD/o 
400,00) 450,00) 2,005,965,475 423,557 23,557 O.QD/o 0 0 0 O.QD/o 
450,00) 500,00) 1,664,862,143 474,185 24,185 O.QD/o 0 0 0 O.QD/o 
500,CXXl 600,00) 2. 521,854,590 546,092 46,092 6.QD/o 6,CXXl 2,766 2,766 0.5% 
600,CXXl 700,00) 1,658,941,186 645,00) 45,CXXl 10.QD/o 16,CXXl 4,500 10,500 1.6% 
700,CXXl 800,00) 1,266,569,350 746,358 46,358 10.QD/o 26,CXXl 4,636 20,636 2.8% 
800,CXXl 900,00) 965,729,431 846,389 46,389 14.2% 40,200 6,587 32,587 3.9% 
900,00) 1, CXXl,CXXl 718,093,988 947,354 47,354 15.QD/o 55,200 7,103 47,303 5.QD/o 
1, CXXl,CXXl 2. CXXl, CXXl 1,963,386,331 1,265,884 265,884 15.QD/o 205,200 39,883 95,083 7.5% 
2. CXXl, CXXl 3, CXXl, CXXl 322,339,076 2,31fl,697 31fl,697 15.QD/o 355,200 58,155 263,355 11.QD/o 
3,CXXl,CXXl + 578,881,499 7,059,530 4,059,530 15.QD/o 608,930 964,130 13.7% 
Figures in Costa Rical colones 
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Once the tax liability per income group is obtained it is possible to calculate ATR 
by dividing that liability by tax filers' per capita income (Yi pc) for each income level. As 
was done for the pre· reform schedule, the remaining progressivity measures (MRP, LP, 
RIP, RSA), are calculated for the post-reform period (See Table XII). Ti/Yi for the RSA 
calculation corresponds to the 1989 tax liability divided by 1987 income per income 
bracket, whereas TN is the 1989 total tax liability divided by 1987 total income. 
Given that a special procedure was followed to obtain post-reform progressivity 
indexes, and in order to have comparative results for both periods under study (pre-
reform and post-reform), the methodology used for the 1989 tax schedule was used for 
the 198 7 schedule as well. Results for 1987 under Procedure II are presented next. 
Tax liability is calculated by multiplying 1987 tax rates -from Table VI- by the 
amount by which the per capita income exceeds the lower bound of the corresponding 
income range (See Table XIII). For a better understanding of this calculation process, the 
800,000 to 900,000 case will be explained. This income class has an excess of 46,389 
over the lower bound. If this excess is multiplied by its corresponding marginal tax rate it 
would yield 15,772. Now, it is necessary to account for the tax yield of the previous 
800 000 colones that conform to the total income of 846,389. Taxation of the previous 
' 
800,000 yields a tax liability of 162,000, which if added to 15,772 results in a 177,832 
tax liability for people pertaining to the 800,000 to 900,000 income group. Following this 
procedure the tax yield is calculated for each income level; this yield is in turn used to 
calculate the A TR. 
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Table XII. Progressivitv Measures 
Posketmn (Procedure U) 
Income Group Average Marginal MRP LP RP RSA RSAU 
(colones) Tax icE Tax icE 
0.1-SO,CXX> 0.0000 0.0000 1.0CXX> 1.0204 1.0203 
50,CXX>.1-100,CXX> 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0204 1.0203 
1 OO,CXX>.1-150,CXX> 0.0000 0.0000 O.OCXX> 1.0000 1.0204 1.0203 
150,CXX>.1-200,CXX> 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0204 1.0203 
200,CXX>.1-250,CXX> 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0CXX> 1.0204 1.0203 
250,CXX>.1-300,CXX> 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0204 1.0203 
300,CXX>.1-350,CXX> O.OCXX> 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0204 1.0203 
350,CXX>.1-400,CXX> 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0204 1.0203 
400,CXX>.1-450,CXX> 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0204 1.0203 
450,CXX>.1-500,CXX> 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0204 1.0203 
500,CXX>.1-000,CXX> 0.0051 0.0000 0.0000 11.8478 0.9448 1.0152 1.0151 
600,CXX>.1-700,CXX> 0.0163 0.1CXX> 0.0400 6.1428 0.9149 1.0038 1JXl37 
700,CXX>.1-800,CXX> 0.0276 0.1CXX> 0.0000 3.6168 0.9256 0.9922 0.9921 
800,CXX>.1-900,CXX> 0.0385 0.1420 0.0420 3.6882 0.8924 0.9811 0.9810 
900, CXX>.1-1 CXX>, (XX) 0.0499 0.1500 o.ooao 3.0041 0.8947 0.9695 0.9693 
1,CXX>,CXX>.1-2,CXX>,CXX> 0.0751 0.1500 0.0000 1.9970 0.9190 0.9438 0.9436 
2,CXX>,CXX>.1-3,CXX>,CXX> 0.1103 0.1500 0.0000 1.3600 0.9554 0.9079 o.90n 
3,000,CXX>.1 + 0.1366 0.1500 0.0000 1.0983 0.9844 0.8810 0.8809 
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Table X II. T 8)( liability Clld A TR cacu.lalion (Procedure 1). Costa Rica, Pre-rebnn Period. 
Cher ~D hcome(YQ hcomeper Excess on MTR Tel)( up t> Excess Tel)( liab. ATR 
(colones) (colones) ~(Yipc) lower bound lower bound ax per cap. 
0 SO,CXXI ~ 3,270 3,270 5.00/o 2,500 163 163 5.0% 
so.c:m 100,CXXl 8723310 78,588 28,588 5.0o/o 5,CXXl 1,429 3,929 5.0% 
100,CXXl 150,CXXl 26033069 129,518 29,518 6.2% 8,100 1,830 6,830 5.3% 
150,CXXl 200,CXXl 73404558 179,036 29,036 12.4% 14,300 3,600 11.700 6.5% 
200,CXXl 2SO,CXXl 294242023 231,141 31,141 15.SO/o 22.200 4,920 19,220 8.3% 
2SO,CXXl 300,CXXl 939619309 279,649 29,649 17.3% 30,860 5,135 27,335 9.8% 
300,CXXl 350,c:m 3102847653 323,956 23,956 19.00/o 40,360 4,552 35,412 10.9% 
350,CXXl 400,CXXl 2530087294 373,224 23,224 19.6% 50,11J) 4,552 44,912 12.0% 
400,CXXl 450,CXXl 2005965475 423,557 23,557 21.0% IJJ,860 4,947 55,107 13.0% 
450,CXXl 500,CXXl 1664862143 474,185 24,185 23.5% n,410 5,683 66,343 14.0% 
500,CXXl eoo.c:m 2521854590 546,092 46,092 26.6% 99,010 12,261 84,671 15.5% 
GOO,CXXl 700,CXXl 1658941186 645,CXXl 45,CXXl 29.1% 128,060 13,073 112,083 17.4% 
700,CXXl eoo.c:m 1266569350 746,358 46,358 34.0% 162,060 15,762 143,822 19.3% 
eoo.c:m 900,CXXl 965729431 846,389 46,389 34.0% 196,060 15,m 1n,832 21.0% 
900,CXXl 1, c:m.c:m 718093988 947,354 47,354 34.0% 230,060 16,100 212, 11JJ 22.4% 
1, c:m,c:m 2,CXXl,CXXl 1963386331 1,265,684 265,684 41.0% 639,560 108,880 338,940 26.8"/o 
2,CXXl,CXXl 3,CXXl, (XX) 322339076 2.387.6ffl 387,6fll 48.4% 1,123,560 187,645 827,205 34.6% 
3,CXXl,CXXl + 578881499 7,059,530 4,059,530 49.7% 2,017,587 3,141,147 44.5% 
Figures in Cosa Rica1 colones 
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The numerical values for the remaining different measures were computed for the 
income ranges corresponding to the different income groups for 1987 under Procedure II 
(See Table XIV). Ti!Yi for RSA calculation is equal to pre-reform tax liability divided by 
pre-reform income. T/Y is pre-reform total tax liability under Procedure II divided by 
total pre-reform income. The results will be shown in the next chapter. 
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Table XIV. Progressivity Measures 
Pre-rebrm (Procedure I) 
k'lcome Group Average Marginal MRP LP RIP RSb.l RSb. u 
(colones) Taxra Tax rae 
0.1-50,CXXl 0.0500 0.0500 1.0000 1.1446 1.1401 
50,CXXl.1-100,CXXl 0.0500 0.0500 0.0000 1.0000 1.1446 1.1401 
100,CXXl.1-150,(XX) 0.0527 0.0020 0.0120 0.9902 1.1413 1.1368 
150,CXXl.1-200,CXXl 0.())54 0.1240 0.0020 0.9373 1.1261 1.1217 
200,CXXl.1-250,CXXl 0.0832 0.1580 0.0340 0.9184 1.1046 1.1003 
250,CXXl.1-300,CXXl o.oon 0.1732 0.0152 1.n19 0.9164 1.0871 1.0828 
300,CXXl.1-350,(XX) 0.1093 0.1900 0.0168 1.7382 0.9094 1.0731 1.009:1 
350, CXXl.1-400,CXXl 0.1203 0.1960 0.0060 1.6288 0.9140 1.0598 1.0557 
400,CXXl.1-450,CXXl 0.1301 0.2100 0.0140 1.6141 0.9082 1.0481 1.0440 
450,CXXl.1-500,CXXl 0.1399 0.2350 0.0250 1.6796 0.8894 1.0363 1.0322 
500,CXXl.1-600,CXXl 0.1550 0.2660 0.0310 1.7156 0.8687 1.0180 1.0141 
600,CXXl.1-700,CXXl 0.1738 0.2905 0.0245 1.6717 0.8587 0.9955 0.9916 
700,CXXl.1-800,CXXl 0.1927 0.3400 0.0495 1.7644 0.8175 0.9727 0.9689 
800,CXXl.1-900,(XX) 0.2101 0.3400 0.0000 1.6182 0.8356 0.9517 0.9480 
900,CXXl.1-1 (XX), (XX) 0.2240 0.3400 0.0000 1.5182 0.8505 0.9350 0.9314 
1,CXXl,CXXl.1-2,CXXl,CXXl o.26n 0.4095 0.0095 1.5294 O.Bre4 0.8822 0.8788 
2,CXXl,CXXl.1-3,CXXl,CXXl 0.3464 0.4840 0.0745 1.3970 0.7895 0.7874 0.7844 
3,CXXl,CXXl.1 + 0.4450 0.4970 0.0130 1.1170 0.9062 0.6687 0.6661 
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CHAPTERV 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Pre-reform Period (Procedure I) 
In the pre-reform period, the average tax rate increases as income rises in the 
250,000 to 3,000,000 colones range. That is, the tax as a percentage of income is higher 
for each level when moving up in the income scale. The lowest income groups have a 
zero average tax rate whereas the average tax rate decreases for the highest income level. 
In other words, the tax is proportional for the lowest income groups and regressive for the 
highest, being progressive for most of the income scale. On the other hand, the marginal 
tax rate increases all along the income scale, from 0.05 for the lowest income group to a 
0.497 for the highest income level, which implies that after the MTR the tax schedule is 
progressive as income rises. 
In conclusion, the income tax appears to be progressive for most people after both 
measures (ATR and MTR) even though A TR does not coincide with the MTR for the 
lowest income levels and the highest income groups. 
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MRP is zero for the lowest income group and the 800,000 to 1 ,000,000 income 
range, and positive for the remaining income groups. Consequently, the MRP shows a 
proportional income tax for the lowest income group and the two middle-income classes. 
However, it does not show any regressivity. Overall, the MRP seems to report a situation 
in which progressivity reigns. 
The pre-reform period shows an LP that is always greater than one, i.e., the 
percentage change in tax liability is always greater than the percentage change in income, 
so that (T1-T0)/T0 > (Y1-Y0)/Y0. Consequently, the MTR is always greater than the ATR, 
which is the case of a progressive tax structure. This result supports what was concluded, 
in theory, about the ATR, MTR, and MRP measures. Moreover, the RIP measure is less 
than one throughout the income scale, i.e., the percentage change in income after tax is 
less than the percentage change in income before tax. Thus, the tax is progressive for all 
income levels by the RIP measure. Furthermore, given that the RIP gets smaller while 
moving up the income scale, the tax gets more and more progressive as income increases. 
RSA is greater than one for the 0 to 600,000 range. For those income levels the 
after-tax income share is greater than the pre-tax share. On the other hand, RSA is less 
than one for the 600,000.1 to 3,000,000 income groups, i.e., for those individuals their 
after tax income share is less than their pre-tax share. Lower-income groups are better off 
and higher-income groups are worse off, given that there has been a greater increase in 
the share of the poorer people relative to the richer people. Therefore, RSA shows some 
income redistribution resulting from the tax schedule change that took place with the 
1988 Tax Reform. 
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Pre-reform Period (Procedure II). 
A TR and MTR always increase throughout the different income levels. Although 
A TR and MTR are equal for the two lowest income groups, MTR is always greater than 
the A TR for the remaining levels. Even when the average tax rate keeps rising for all the 
income levels the MTR is constant for the two lowest income groups and three of the 
upper income levels. Nonetheless the tax system may still be progressive (Wart and 
Ruggeri, p.l35). Furthennore, the MRP measure is equal to zero for both the lowest 
income groups and the 800,000.I to I ,000,000 income range, and positive for the 
remaining income levels. It is possible to conclude from the MRP that the lowest income 
group (0-50,000 income range) has a proportional income tax. The same seems to be the 
case for the two middle income groups (800,000 to 900,000 and 900,000.I to I ,000,000), 
for which the MRP is zero. However, most of the income levels still portray a progressive 
situation. LP is always greater than one. By this measure, therefore, the pre-refonn 
regime is progressive, implying that the percentage change in tax liability is greater than 
the change in income, or that the MTR is greater than the A TR for all income groups. On 
the other hand, RIP is less than one for I5 out of the I7 groups, and equal to one for the 
two lowest income groups. Consequently, after the RIP measure the tax is proportional 
for the 0 to I 00,000 income class and progressive for the rest of the income categories. In 
other words, the percentage change in income with the tax is less than the percentage 
change in income without the tax. Finally, by both MRP and RIP measures, the income 
tax for the I987 fiscal year was proportional for the lowest income class, under Procedure 
II. 
so 
The RSA measure is greater than one for the lower-income groups (0 to 600,000 
income range). That situation indicates that high income groups' relative economic 
position worsened as a result of the tax and, that of low and high income groups 
improved, which makes it evident that some income redistribution takes place with regard 
to the 1987 taxation schedule. 
Pre~reform results for the different progressivity measures under procedures I and 
II are very similar. For both procedures, the personal income tax turns out to be 
progressive overall, even though the ATR with procedure II is greater for all income 
levels than the A TR with procedure I. 
Moreover, by the RSA measure, income redistribution from the higher-income 
groups to the lower-income groups seems to be the case under both Procedures I and II. 
Specifically, RSA is greater than one for the same income levels under both 
methodologies. The same is true with those RSA' s less than one. 
Finally, given that procedure II produces the same results as procedure I (which 
uses effective ATR), it can be concluded that the procedure used to derive the ATR for 
both 1987 and 1989 fiscal years (procedure II) is not misleading. This is consistent with 
what would have been the results had actual data been used to obtain the different 
measures. 
Post-reform Period (Procedure II). 
The average tax rate increases as income rises, which is an argument in favor of 
the progressivity of the income tax. Compared to the pre-reform period, tax reform results 
in reduced A TR all along the income scale, with rates decreasing from 5 to 30 percentage 
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points. See Table XV. MRP reports a proportional tax for most income brackets, i.e., 14 
out of the 17 income brackets are zero. This is because people were exempted until the 
500,000 income level and because the MTR was the same for both the 600.000 to 
800,000 and the 900,000 to 3,000,000 income ranges. 
On the other hand, by the LP measure, tax reform turns out to be progressive 
given that the elasticity of tax liability with respect to income before tax is always greater 
than one. In other words, percentage increases in income are overwhelmed by the 
percentage increases in the tax liability for each income group. The RIP measure supports 
the results obtained with MRP and the A TR, i.e., that the income tax in the post-reform is 
proportional for the lower income groups (0 to 500,000 income brackets). Furthermore, 
the RIP turned out to be less than one for the higher income levels, i.e., the percentage 
change in income before tax is greater than the percentage change in income after tax. 
Thus, the elasticity of income after tax with respect to income before tax reveals 
progressivity for those brackets. Moreover, the RIP across the income scale are greater in 
the post-reform period than they were in the pre-reform period. This situation shows a 
less progressive tax after reform. 
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Table XV. Comparison of the Progressivity Measures. Pre and Post Reform Tax S1ructure 
Applied to 19871ncome. Costa Rica 1987,1989 
PRE POST PRE POST PRE POST 
Income Group Average Average Marginal Marginal MRP MRP 
(colones) Tax rate Tax rate Tax rate Tax rate 
0.1-50,000 0.05 0 0.05 0 
50,000. 1-1 00,000 0.05 0 0.05 0 0 0 
1 00,000.1-150,000 0.05273486 0 0.062 0 0.012 0 
150,000.1-200,000 0.06535242 0 0.124 0 0.062 0 
200,000.1-250,000 0.08315379 0 0.158 0 0.034 0 
250,000.1-300,000 o.oon4817 0 0.1732 0 0.0152 0 
300,000.1-350,000 0.10930995 0 0.19 0 0.0168 0 
350,000. 1-4001000 0.12033504 0 0.196 0 0.000 0 
400 ,000.1-450,()()() 0.13010519 0 0.21 0 0.014 0 
4501000.1-5001 ()()() 0.13991045 0 0.235 0 0.025 0 
500,000. 1-600,()()() 0.15504808 0.00506424 0.266 0.06 0.031 0.06 
600,000.1-7001()()() o.173n14 0.01627913 0.2005 0.1 0.0245 0.04 
700,000.1-8001000 0.19269801 0.02764865 0.34 0.1 0.0495 0 
BOO ,000. 1-900,000 0.21010695 0.03850145 0.34 0.142 0 0.042 
900, ()()() .1-1 000, ()()() 0.2239504 0.04993176 0.34 0.15 0 0.008 
1, ()()() t 000 • 1-2, ()()() 1 ()()() o.26n4927 0.07511163 0.4095 0.15 0.0695 0 
2 ,()()() 1 000.1-3,0001()()() 0.34644485 0.11029647 0.484 0.15 0.0745 0 
3, 000,000.1 + 0.44495121 0.13657134 0.497 0.15 0.013 0 
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Table XV. Comparison of the Progressivity Measl.les. Pre and Post Refonn Tax Structure 
Applied to 19871ncome. Costa Rica 1987,1989. Continued 
PRE POST PRE POST PRE POST 
Income Group LP LP RIP RIP RSA RSA 
(colones) 
0.1-50,000 1.14457831 1.02040816 
50,000.1-1 00,000 1 1.14457831 1.02040816 
1 00,000.1-150,000 0.99021906 1.1412833 1.02040816 
150,000.1-200,000 o.93n5166 1.12608143 1.02040816 
200,000.1-250,000 0.91836558 1.10463399 1.02040816 
250,000. 1-300,000 1.n190025 0.91637386 1.0870504 1.02040816 
300,000.1-350,000 1.73817656 o.90940n7 1.07312054 1.02040816 
350,000.1-400,000 1.6287858 0.91398434 1.0598373 1.02040816 
400,000.1-450,000 1.61407864 0.90815578 1.04806604 1.02040816 
450,000.1-500,000 1.67964579 0.88944227 1 1.03625247 1.02040816 
500,000.1-600,000 1.71559691 11.84n811 0.86868848 0.94478462 1.01801437 1.01524057 
600,000.1-700,000 1.67173653 6.14283456 0.85872118 0.91489367 0.99545614 1.00379681 
700,000.1-800,000 1.7644188 3.61681288 0.81753794 0.92559135 o.9n65299 0.99219525 
800,000.1-900,000 1.61822347 3.6881732 0.83555616 0.89235704 0.95167837 0.98112097 
900,000.1-1 0001000 1.51819331 3.00409987 0.8504611 0.89467258 0.93499952 0.96945739 
1 ,000,000.1-2,000,000 1.52941592 1.9970276 o.80041m 0.91902983 0.88222979 0.94376364 
2,000 '000 .1-3,000,000 1.39704n6 1.35997103 0.78952786 0.95537442 0.78741584 0.90786075 
3, 000,000.1 + 1.11697639 1.09832703 0.90022664 0.98444729 0.66873348 0.88104965 
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Tax reform reduced the marginal tax rates for all income groups, with a large 
reduction for the higher income classes. Consequently, with this measure it seems that the 
post-reform tax structure tends to reduce overall progressivity. Furthermore, the post-
reform MRP is greater than the pre-reform MRP only for people whose income is in the 
450.000 to 600.000 and 700.000 to 900.000 income brackets . In other words, for twelve 
income groups the pre-reform MRP exceeds the 1989 MRP. Accordingly, the post-reform 
tax structure is less progressive (smaller degree of progression) than the pre-reform 
structure for most income classes. 
The pattern of RSA shows how progressivity declined for the lower income 
classes and increased for the upper income levels, based on the fact that the RSA 
decreased for the 0 to 600.000 income range and increased above 600.000 income. 
Therefore, tax reform reduced the relative income share of individuals below 600.000 and 
increased the relative income share of those with higher income, i.e. over 600.000 colones 
a year. For the former group, the lowest income earners (from 0 to 250.000 colones) had a 
larger decrease (12 to 8 percentage points) in their RSA than those with higher income (6 
to 0.2 percentage points reduction) (See Figure 2). Moreover, the RSA declines faster in 
the pre-reform than it does in the post-reform period. This situation is an argument in 
favor of less overall progressivity after reform. Thus, from the standpoint of income 
redistribution, tax reform impaired the lower income groups' economic position and 
improved that of higher income classes. 
Clearly, the results indicate a 1988 tax reform strategy of reducing the income tax 
for higher income earners to prevent tax evasion and to have a positive effect on 
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Government revenues. Finally, a tradeoff between efficiency and equity appears to be the 
case. 
S6 
FIQU'8 2. Pra an:t PostRebmRSA, Costa Rica, 1987,1989 
1.2 
~-------
0.8 
0.6 
0.4 
0.2 + 
0 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
In the Economic Literature much work has been done on progressivity measures 
and on the progressivity concept since early in this century. Studies like those from 
Musgrave and Thin (1948), and Pechman and Okner (1974), have dealt with empirical 
work. Other studies have been more theoretical. In any event, "the optimal progressivity 
measure" has not been designed yet. Scholars are still attempting to develop new 
measures for analyzing the impact that taxation has on income distribution. That is the 
case, for example, of the Relative Share of Adjustment (RSA) measure (Baum, 1991) 
used for the purposes of this study. Classical progressivity measures such as the Lorenz 
Curve and Gini Index have been traditionally widely used. However, they have some 
relative disadvantages compared to other measures that give an idea of the impact of the 
tax per income bracket; for example, Musgrave and Thin's structural measures or Baum' s 
RSA. Moreover, the latter measures do not use utility function comparisons so that they 
are easier to calculate and still yield valuable information. 
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With respect to data and methodology, there were some limitations that needed to 
be solved, given the unavailability of reliable data for post-reform. However, it was 
possible to use Procedure II, which proved to be consistent with what the results would 
have been if the real data had been used. This method gives confidence to the findings 
obtained. 
Furthermore, the 1988 Costa Rican Tax Reform Act was proposed as a partial 
remedy to Costa Rica's fiscal situation in the latter 1980's. The Tax Reform intended to 
increase government revenue by decreasing tax avoidance from high income groups and 
to improve income distribution. The new tax schedule implied more exempt income 
levels and lower marginal tax rates, especially for higher income groups. Averages tax 
rates were also smaller. When obtaining the value for the different progressivity measures 
for both pre- and post-reform periods, it is evident that tax schedules are progressive in 
both cases, but that overall progressivity is reduced in the post-reform period. That is, the 
degree of progression is smaller in the post-reform period. This result is explained by the 
increase in the exemption level that benefits higher incomes and by the relatively greater 
reduction of marginal tax rates for high income brackets. Moreover, in the post-reform 
period there was some income redistribution, as was the case in pre-reform. Nonetheless, 
this redistribution lessened in post-reform. Tax reform reduced the relative income shares 
of lower income groups and increased those of higher income groups. On the other hand, 
the income tax-to-GDP ratio that had been consistently declining since 1982, stabilized in 
post-reform years. This indicates to some extent, that the government goal of improving 
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its revenues was attained. Thus, as pointed out, a trade off between efficiency and equity 
appears to be have resulted from 1988 tax reform in Costa Rica. 
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